Indiana Law Journal
Volume 1

Issue 1

Article 1

1-1926

Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute
Oliver P. Field
Indiana University

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Field, Oliver P. (1926) "Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1 , Article 1.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol1/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

INDIANA
LAW JOURNAL
Vol. I

JANUARY, 1926

No. I

EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE
OmivE_

P. FmrPD*

What is the effect upon a statute of a judicial decision that the
statute is unconstitutional? What of the acts of persons who have
relied on the statute before the decision of unconstitutionality was
rendered? The practical effect of the answers which are to be given
to these questions may be illustrated by two types of cases which have
been before the courts of Indiana or the courts of other states. Suppose in the first place that an officer arrests a person by virtue of
authority granted in a statute. The person arrested attacks the constitutionality of the statute. The court decides that the statute is
unconstitutional. Then the person who has been arrested brings an
action of damages against the officer. Can the officer plead the statute
under which he acted, in justification for his act? Suppose in the
second place that a municipality floats a bond issue. The statute under
which the bonds are issued is assailed in the courts and they decide
that it is constitutional. Six months later the state court decides that
the statute is unconstitutional, and reverses their former decision. Can
the holder of the bonds recover in an action against the city? Does a
declaration of unconstitutionality have the effect of repealing a statute
or does the statute become inoperative from the time of the decision
which declares it unconstitutional, or is the statute to be considered
void ab initio from the date of the purported enactment of it by the
legislature? It is with the answers which the courts have given to
these questions and others which have been presentd by actual cases
that the writer will deal. This paper will consider only those cases
involving total unconstitutionality and will not attempt to handle
the cases of partial unconstitutionaliy. 1
The Supreme Court of Indiana has said that if a statute is unconstitutional it "is no law, and cannot be used to give appellee a right
of action against appellant."12 And again, in passing upon an amend* See biographical note p.

32.

On the effect of partial unconstitutionality see 15 R. C. L. sees. 121-133;
Note, Ann. Cas. 1916 D 89; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (5 ed.) 211-

216.
2Bedford Quarriesv. Bough, (1907) 168 Ind. 671, 80 N. E. 539, 14 L. R. A.
418.
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ment to a statute which was held to be unconstitutional, the court
3
said in Carr v. State,
"An act which violates the Constitution has no power and can, of
course, neither build up or tear down. It can neither create new
rights nor destroy existing ones. It is an empty legislative declaration
without force or vitality."
In accordance with the views expressed above it is held in Indiana
that a repealing act which is unconstitutional can have no effect upon
the statute sought to be repealed and the previous statute remains the
law as though the legislature had not made any attempt to change it.4
In the very interesting case of Johnson v. The Board etc.,5 in which
a statute was held unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation
of contracts, the court was asked to pass upon the question whether
fraud had been used in the procurement of the passage of the statute
in the legislature. The court refused to pass upon this point because
it was clear that if no statute whatever had been passed no question
of fraud could have arisen. The statute before the court was unconstitutional. An unconstitutional statute is absolutely void and to be
considered as though it had never been passed. Therefore, the court
argued, no question of fraud could arise in connection with this
statute.
That an unconstitutional statute is to be considered as though it
had never been enacted by the legislature is also the view of a number
of other courts. For example, the United States Supreme Court has
said,"
"That act was therefore as inoperative as if it had never been
passed, for an unconstitutional act is not a law, and can neither confer
a right or immunity nor operate to supersede any existing valid law."
And an appellate court of Texas7 has said that an unconstitutional statute "is of no more force or validity than a piece of blank paper," while
the Minnesota court" has expressed the same idea by stating that it "is
3

(1890) 127 Ind. 204, 26 N. E. 778; 11 L. R. A. 370.

4

Igoe v. State, (1860) 14 Ind. 239; Grubbs v. State, (1865) 24 Ind. 295.
See also Oolitic Stone Co. of Ind. v. Ridge, (1900) 169 Ind. 639, 91 N. E. 944.
5 (1894) 140 Ind. 152, 39 N. E. 311.

6 Chicago, Indianmpolia & Louisville Ry. v. Hackett, (1912) 227 U. S. 559,
S. Ct., 57 L. Ed. 966. See also Louisiana . Pillsbuny, (1881) 15 Otto 287,
26 L. Ed. 1090, where the court said in the course of an opinion declaring a
state statute unconstitutional because impairing the obligation of contracts,
"Legislation of a state thus impairing the obligation of contract made under
its authority, is null and void; and the courts in enforcing the contracts will
pursue the same course and apply the same remedies as though such invalid

legislation had never existed."

Gunn v. Barry, (1872) 15 Wall. 610, 21 L.

Ed. 212; 12 C. J. 800-1.
7 Ex parte Bockhorn, (1911) 62 Tex. Cr. 651, 138 S. W. 706.
8 Minn. Sugar Co. v. Iverson, (1903) 91 Minn. 30, 97 N. W. 454. See also
Finders v. Bodle, (1899) 58 Neb. 57, 78 N. W. 480; State of Kans. v. Bankers
& Mutual Benefit Assn., (1880) 23 Kan. 355; Boales v. Ferguson, (1898) 55
Neb. 565, 76 N. W. 18; City of Henderson v. Lieber's Exr's., (1917) 175 Ky.
15, 192 S. W. 830.
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simply a statute in form, is not a law, and under every circumstance
or condition lacks the force of law."
In accord with this doctrine that a statute which is declared unconstitutional is void ab initio it has been held that a person accused
of a crime and convicted under an unconstitutional statute is entitled
to a reversal and as a consequence, his freedom. This is true even
though the accused pleaded guilty, ° and even though the defective
statute related only to the term of court at which the accused was
tried,"' having no relation to the substantive law under which he was
tried. The same rule has been applied to judgments rendered by a
court in civil cases.' 2 It has also been held that unconstitutional
statutes which purported to incorporate' 13 or disincorporate 4 municipaites fail entirely to accomplish their purpose and as a result of this
the taxes which are paid to the city may be recovered.15 However, it
should be noted that the courts have gone far to defeat the recovery
of taxes paid under statutes which prove to be unconstitutional by
holding that if the taxes were paid voluntarily they cannot be recovered. 16 If the taxes were paid involuntarily, however, they may be
recovered.
9Norwood v. State, (1924) Miss. 101 So. 366; Brewer v. State, (1905)
Ala. 39 So. 927; State v. Greer, (1924) Fla. 102 So. 739; Ex parte Siebold,
(1879) 100 U. S. 376, 25 L. Ed. 719; Candy v. State, (1909) 162 Ala. 678, 49
So. 801; McFarlin v.State, (1909) 123 S. W. 133.
10 Norwood v. State, (1924) Miss. 101 So. 366.
11Ex parte State ex rel. Smith v. Thurman, (1921) Ala. 88 So. 899.
1 Yellow Pine Lmbr. Co. v. Randall, (1905) 145 Ala. 653, 39 So. 565.
13 Campbell v. Bryant, (1905) 104 Va. 509, 52 S.E. 638.
14 Ringling v. Hempstead, (1911) 193 Fed. 600. It should be remarked
that in the case of municipal corporations the de facto doctrine is often resorted to. See note in 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 94-107.
15 See note 13. See also Pearl River County v. Lacey Lmbr. Co., (1921)
Miss. 86 So. 755; Board of Highway Commissioners v. Bloomington, (1912)
253 Ill. 164, 97 N. E. 280, Ann. Cas. 1913 A 471; State v. Several Parcels of
Land, (1907) 78 Neb. 703, 111 N. W. 602 (Enjoining tax). In Dennison
Mfg. v. Wright, (1923) Ga. 120 S.E. 120, the court held that the taxes could
be recovered from the collector when they were paid under protest, because
the protest was said to constitute notice to the collector that he pays away
the taxes at his own peril, for he knows they will be contested. The collector
is given this consolation, "Besides, should there be any recovery against the
defendant, the legislature should and doubtless will, reimburse the defendant, as the state has received the money raised by the exaction of this tax."
Several cases are reviewed in the course of the opinion.
13See Tuttle v. Everett, (1875) 57 Miss. 27, 24 Am. Rep. 622; Detroit v.
Martin, (1876) 34 Mich. 170, 22 Am. Rep. 512, for an example of payment
to prevent sale of land, held voluntary. See Cooley, Taxation (3ed.) p. 1496,
note 1, and p. 1495. Bonds issued by a municipality under an unconstitutional statute have been held void even in the hands of an innocent purchaser. State v. Breckler, (1925) Wis. 202 N. W. 144. It has been said that
an assessment levied under an unconstitutional statute does not create even
an "apparent lien" and therefore no cloud on the title. Heywood v. City
of Buffalo, (1856) 14 N. Y. 534.
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An interesting application of this doctrine that an unconstitutional
statute is "fatally smitten at its birth' ' 7 is to be found in those cases
where a person seeks to enjoin the threatened enforcement of some
state statute which he alleges to be unconstitutional. The defence
was often interposed in these cases that this was in effect a suit against
the state and therefore within the prohibition of the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution. The federal courts have held
however, that these suits are not prohibited by that amendment ftnd
have enjoined the threatened enforcement of the state statutes under
proper circumstances. 8 In reaching this result the courts have reasoned that if the statute is unconstitutional it must fall. When the
statute falls the defendant officers are left "standing naked, as individuals clothed with no power emanating from the state, and thus
viewed and considered alone as individuals assuming to act under
the guise of law where no law exists; . . . "'9 And of course it
follows in a most satisfactorily logical manner that the person threatening irreparable damage may be restrained in his private capacity.
It must not be imagined from the foregoing statements that all of
our courts are in agreement as to the effect of unconstitutionality.
Thus far we have examined situations in which there has been no particular conflict amongst the courts as to the effect of unconstitutionality. But so soon as we pass to the other situations which have been
presented to the courts involving this point we find the decisions
in conflict. The cases thus far have illustrated the view that a statute
is absolutely void and never had any legal existence and that consequently any acts done in reliance on such an unconstitutional statute
are not protected in any way. Neither the statutes nor acts done
under them have any legal sanction under this view.
Take for example the question whether an unconstitutional bounty
statute leaves a sufficient moral or equitable obligation on the state
to justify the appropriation of public moneys which have been raised
by taxation. Some courts have held that such an appropriation is
constitutional when the object of it is to recompense officers or private
individuals who have suffered because of the statute. 0 Other courts
have refused to uphold such an appropriation because they insist that
no moral obligation can be raised by an unconstitutional statute.2'
'1EX parte Bockhorn, (1911)

62 Tex. Cr. 651, 138 S. W. 706.
18 Ex parte Young, (1907) 209 U. S. 123, 38 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714,
13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 952; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, (1912) 223 U. S. 605,
32 S. Ct. 340, 56 L. Ed. 570; West. Union Teig. Co. v. Myatt, (1899) 98 Fed.

355. See 43 AM. L. Rnv. 770 on the origin of the so-called "stripping doc-

trine". See also Saratoga, etc., Corp. v. Pratt, (1920) N. Y. 125 N. E. 834.
19 Kans. Natural Gas Co. v. Haskell, (1909) 172 Fed. 555.
20 U. S. v. Realty Co., (1896) 163 U. S. 427; Miller vo. Dunn, (1887) 72 Cal.
462, 14 P. 27, 1 A. S. R. 67.
21 Mich. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Auditor Genl., (1900) 124 Mich. 674, 83 N. W.
625, 56 L. R. A. 329, 83 A. S. R. 359; Minn. Sugar Co. v. Iverson, (1903)
91 Minn. 30, 97 N. W. 454, criticizing U. S. v. Realty Co. cited in note 20.
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The Louisiana court has decided that an unconstitutional statute cannot create a natural or conscience obligation under the provision of
the Code governing those obligations. 22 On the other hand it was
held in Arkansas recently that the fact that work was done under an
unconstitutional statute does not prevent recovery from a road district
23
on quantum meruit.
Another point on which the courts are in conflict is the effect of an
unconstitutional statute which purports to create a public office. In
the leading case on this subject, Norton v. Shelby County,24 Justice
Field said,
"An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in
legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed."
While this probably represents the weight of authority on this point of
law, there is nevertheless considerable authority which holds to the
contrary. In Kentucky it has been held that a judge appointed under
an unconstitutional statute is a de facto officer and that his acts are
2
valid until the unconstitutionality of the statute has been declared. 5
And in a Mlaine case a special attorney who was appointed for the
state under an unconstitutional statute was held to be a de jure officer
and his acts were to be treated as valid because they were said to have
been done with color of authority." In the course of the opinion
in the last cited case the court quoted with approval the following
statement from Lang v. the Mayor,2" which is perhaps the leading
case in opposition to Norton v. Shelby County referred to above,
"Every law of the Legislature, however repugnant to the Constitution, has not only the appearance and semblance of authority, but
the force of law."
Here we have set forth a doctrine that a statute which is declared
unconstitutional is inoperative only from the time of the decision and
not from the time of its purported enactment. This view is of course
opposed to the views expressed by the Indiana court in the cases cited
in the first paragraph of this paper.
22

Factors and Traders Ins. Co. v. City of New Orleans, (1873)

25 La.

Ann. 454.
23
24

Road Improvement Dist. No. B v. Burkett, (1924) Ark. 260 S. W. 718.
(1886) 118 U. S. 425, 6 S. Ct. 1121, 30 L. Ed. 178. On this question

see note 8 Mich. L. Rev. 229; 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 94; Mechem, Public Officers, sec. 324 note 3, and sec. 326. It seems that the distinction which is
drawn in some of these cases is that in the case of municipalities the corporation is not created by the unconstitutional statute, but that its status
or creation may not be challenged except by the state. See also Van Slyke
v. 2Trempealeau, etc., Ins Co., (1876) 39 Wis. 390, 20 Am. REP. 50 and note.
5Nagel v. Bosworth, (1912) 198 Ky. 897, 147 S. W. 940.
2
6 State v. Poulin, (1909) 105 Me. 224, 74 A. 119.
2
7 Lang v. Mayor of Bayonee, (1907) 74 N. J. L. 455, 68 A. 90, 15 L. R. A.
N. S.) 94.
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There is perhaps no instance where these two views come into
clearer relief or sharper conflict than in the type of case of which the
famous Indiana case of Sumner v. Beeler 28 is an illustration. In the
case of Sumner v. Beeler the plaintiff had been arrested under a statute
which the court decided to be unconstitutional. It is not possible to
tell for a certainty whether the arrest had been made before the statute
had been declared unconstitutional or not, but the court seems to
assume that it was, and writers have assumed that such was the case 20
The defendant officer was held liable in an action for damages. In
the course of its opinion the court said,
"All persons are presumed to know the law, and if they act under
an unconstitutional enactment of the legislature, they do so at their
own peril, and must take the consequences."
Two cases from other jurisdictions in which there was no doubt but
what the acts complained of were committed before the statute was
declared unconstitutional will serve to further illustrate the appli30
cation of the doctrine of the Beeler case. In Campbell v. Sherman,
the Wisconsin court was asked to pass upon these facts. The defendant sheriff (acting through a deputy) seized a steamboat belonging
to the plaintiff under a writ from the Circuit Court of the state for
the purpose of enforcing a maritime lien. The steamboat was destroyed by fire. The statute which authorized the issuance of the
writ was declared unconstitutional. In an action for unlawful seizure
and conversion the sheriff set up as a defence the statute which had
been relied on in the proceedings. The officer was held not to have
any defence. In the Massachusetts case of Kelly v. Bemis,31 a Justice
of the Peace issued a mittimus under a statute which was later held
unconstitutional. The Justice of the Peace was held liable in an
action in trespass.
In an Iowa case3 2 however, the court held that in such a situation
as that involved in the Massachusetts case last mentioned the Justice
of the Peace was not liable for a mistake in judgment as to the constitutionality of a statute. And in the Washington case of Shafford v
Brown, 33 a fruit inspector destroyed apples under the authority of an
unconstitutional statute. He was held not liable in a subsequent action
by the owner of the apples. In accordance with the two views set forth
above regarding the liability of officers there are two lines of cases
in aiding an officer who
on the liability of individuals for their 3acts
4
acts under an unconstitutional statute.
28

(1875) 50 Ind. 341.

29

See note 64 AM. Dzc. 51, Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, (5ed.) p.

224.
3o

(1874) 35 Wis. 103.

a1 (1855) 4 Gray 83, 64 Am. Oec. 50.
32 Henke v. McCord, (1880) 55 Ia. 378, 7. N. W. 623.
33 (1908) 49 Wash. 307, 95 P. 270.
34 See Cartwrightv. Canode, (1914) 106 Tex. 502, 171 S. W. 157, holding

they are liable. But see Dexter v. Alfred, (1892) 64 Hun. 36, 19 N. Y. S.
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But an officer who acts under an unconstitutional statute is not
criminally liable.3 5 And this decision is not rested upon the lack of
criminal intent, but rather upon the effect of unconstitutionality. A
private person seems, however, to have been held liable in a criminal
action for acts committed under an unconstitutional statute.36
One of the reasons assigned by the courts who hold the officer
civilly liable in these officer cases is that noted in connection with
Suminer v. Beeler, that everybody is presumed to know the law. A
query might be raised whether this maxim refers to a knowledge of
the rules of law or whether it also extends to a knowledge of what the
courts are going to decide. One may know the rules of law very well
but still guess wrong on the question of whether a court was going to
hold a particular statute constitutional or unconstitutional. In other
words, does the term "law" as used in this maxim include judicial
decisions ?3 7 Another point that is sometimes stressed is that of a
writ or statute being clear on its face, either clearly valid or clearly
invalid. When this test is attempted to be applied to the constitutionality of statutes one is immediately struck with the futility of
such a test. When three judges hold it clearly unconstitutional, or
vice versa, does this not seem to be hairsplitting? Another reason
sometimes advanced in the cases is that the executive and legislative
departments of the government are circumscribed by constitutional
limitations and that one of the reasons for such limitations is to protect the rights of the individual against just such excesses of authority
as are involved in these cases. The feeling that the executive department of the government was the personification of tyranny was still
strong in the minds of the people and the courts during the last century and is not yet wholly eradicated. The founders of the state governments put their faith in the legislatures but a century of experience
has resulted in a very considerable distrust of them also, as is reflected
770, where the court said, "It is true that, as a general rule, ignorance of
law cannot be urged as an excuse for a wrong, but we think in this case that
it was competent for the defendant to set up, as a defense or partial defense
to this action, the acts of the commissioner under this statute and that the
acts done by the defendant were done under the direction or orders of the
commissioner." It has been held that a person who takes land under a
statute granting him the power of eminent domain is liable in an action
for trespass if the statute turned out to be unconstitutional. Titus V.
Poland, (1923) Pa. 119 A. 540. Of course a person who commits an act in
reliance on the statute when that statute has previously been held invalid is
subject to suit, as where hogs are impounded under a statute which had been
declared unconstitutional. Ness v. Maxwell, (1895) 32 S. W. 561.
- State v. Goodwin, (1898) 123 N. C. 697.

36.Flaucherv. Camden, (1893) 56 N. J. L. 244, 28 A. 82. But see Strong
v.Daniel (1854) 5 Ind. 348.
37 See for an example of where the rule is not applied so as to include a
knowledge of overruling decisions or later decisions, 20 ENG. AND AM. ENcY.
2ed. p. 818.
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by the detailed bill of rights and other numerous procedural and financial restrictions imposed upon the legislative department by almost
every state constitution. The courts very naturally have come to
regard themselves as the guardians of the rights of the people which
are in constant danger of being invaded by the legislature or the
executive.
The courts which refuse to hold officers civilly liable in the above
mentioned situations argue that a statute should be presumed to be
constitutional until it is declared to be otherwise. They call attention to the statements made by practically every court to the effect
that they will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless
it is essential to the disposition of the case in hand and that they will
regard the statute as constitutional until its unconstitutionality is
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.3 8 These courts insist that
this so-called presumption should mean something and that not only
the judgse are to have the benefit of it. After all, does it not seem
sound to give private individuals and ministerial officers the benefit
of the view that statutes are to be obeyed until they are declared
unconstitutional? Is this not especially so when one remembers that
hundreds of statutes are declared unconstitutional because of technical
or procedural defects, and not because they violate the rights of individuals. This was the case in Sumner v. Beeler, for there the sheriff
had not guessed that the title was defective when compared with the
body of the statute.39
We do not allow private individuals to resist an unconstitutional
statute vi et armis,4° and in many states we do not allow ministerial
officers to question the statute in defending against amndamus proceedings. 41 He is held liable if he acts under a statute which turns out
38 See for example the remark of Collins, J. in Allison v. Corker, (1902)
67 N. J. L. 596, 52 A. 362, 60 L. R. A. 564, when he says, "An unconstitu-

tional statute is not merely blank paper. The solemn act of the Legislature
is a fact to be reckoned with." See also the opinion of Chief Justice Gummere, in Lang v. Mayor, etc., cited in note 27. On the doctrine of reasonable
doubt see Cushman, Constitutional Decisions by a. Bare Majority of the
Court, 19 MICH. L. Rnv.
39 See State v. Young, (1874) 47 Ind. 150.
40 See State v. Skinner, (1900) La. 86 So. 716. However, in Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, (7ed) p. 259, note 2, Strong v. Daniel, (1854) 5 Ind.

348, is cited in support of a statement that persons who have refused obedience to an unconstitutional statute are not protected.

This was not a crim-

inal case, however, but a case in equity. An injunction was issued in that

case to prevent the execution of a judgment on a replevin bond which had

been given under an unconstitutional statute.
41 On this point see note, 47 L. R. A. 512 for a full review of the cases
pro and con. See also Collier, Unconstitutionality as a Defence to Mandamus Against Public Officer Refusing to Enforce Said Statute, 72 CENT.
L. J. 301 criticizing several cases denying such defence. See also note, 64
Am. Dec. 51. On personal interest of the officer, see Braxton County Ct. v.
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to be unconstitutional, and he is liable if he refuses to act when the
statute turns out to be constitutional.4 2 One cannot but feel that the
officer gets the worst of it whichever way he turns. On the other hand,
the judges of the courts of general or appellate jurisdiction are not
liable for a mistake in judgment as to the constitutionality of a
statute.4 3 On the whole, the writer cannot help but feel that the suggestions made by a note writer in this connection are sound when he
says 1. the statute should be presumed to be constitutional, 2. that
the statute should be obeyed by individuals and officers till it is declared unconstitutional, 3. that if there is anything in the nature
of the office or of personal interest to entitle him to it, the officer
should be allowed to question the statute. 44 Should we not cease
regarding the legislature with such suspicion and let those persons
whose rights are alleged to be violated assert the unconstitutionality
of the statute? So far as the courts are concerned the government
now starts the race with a handicap. It is submitted that the cases
opposed to Sumner v. Beeler embody the sounder rule.
There still remain a number of situations in which the application
of the theory that the statute is void ab initio should be tested.
1. Suppose a case where the court declares a statute unconstitutional today, and then six months hence reverses this decision and
decides that the statute is constitutional. If the void ab initio doctrine
be applied the first decision would leave a situation similar to that deW. Va., (1908) 208 U. S. 192, 28 S. Ct. 275, 52 L. Ed. 450. In Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, (1875) 92 U. S. 531, 23 L. Ed. 623, the United States
Supreme Court said, "In either case, if the officer plead the authority of
an unconstitutional law for the non-performance or violation of his duty,
it will not prevent the issuing of the writ. An unconstitutional law will
be treated by the courts as null and void." And again, in Huntington v.
Worthen, (1886) 120 U. S. 93, 30 L. Ed. 588, the court said, in discussing
a complaint that the board of assessment commissioners had not complied
with a statute which was claimed to be unconstitutional, "When, therefore,
under the advice of the Attorney-General, the board or railroad commissioners treated as invalid the direction of the statute . . . it obeyed
the Constitution rather than the Legislature.

It may not be a wise thing,

as a rule, for subordinate executive and ministerial officers ot undertake
to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation prescribing their duties,
and to disregard it if in their judgment it is invalid. . . . but still
the determination of the legal tribunals can alone settle the legality of
their action." The court warns also, that inconvenience to the public and
risk to themselves might result if officers were to set themselves up as
judges of the validity of the statute.
42 Clark v. Miller, (1874) 54 N. Y. 528.
43 On the topic of liability in general as applied to judicial officers, see
Biddle, Liability of Officers Acting in a Judicial Capacity, 15 Am. L. REv.
427, 492, reviewing fully the English and earlier American cases; Note,

14 L. R. A. 138. See also note, 64 AM. Duo. 61. See also Burdick, Torts,
(3ed.) 35; Burdick, Law of the American Constitution, 123.
4See note 64 Am. Dec. 51. See also note in 19 H. L. R. 352 which upholds the view of the cases opposed to the Beeler case.
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scribed by the Indiana court, as though no statute had been passed.
The first question that arises then is how does it happen that there
is any statute for the court to consider in the second case? The second
point which presents itself is what happens to the statute under the
second decision if it be regarded as still on the statute books after
the first decision? All courts seem to agree that the void statute
(if such a contradiction be permitted) is resurrected and is effective
as from the date of its enactment.45 . The purported enactment which
was said to have been fatally smitten at its birth by the constitution
has by some legal hocus pocus been cured of its congenital disease.
46
This is also the Indiana rule.
2. Suppose on the other hand a case in which a statute is declared
to be constitutional today. Six months hence it is held to be unconstitutional. If the doctrine of void ab initio be applied the statute
should be rendered inoperative from the date of its attempted passage
by the legislature. But let us suppose in addition in this case that a
municipality had floated a bond issue which had been sustained by
the first decision. In handling this sort of a.situation the federal
courts have held that the statute is to be regarded as constitutional so
long as the decision sustaining the statute was in force. Rights which
have vested in reliance thereon may not be divested by the second
decision.47 The second decision renders the statute inoperative only
from the date of that decision. At this point one wonders whether
the Indiana court really meant what it said when it propounded the
theory that in-these cases of constitutional or unconstitutional statutes
the court had nothing to do with the invalidating of the statute but
merely expounded a fact which had always existed, namely, that the
4 Black, Constitutional Law, p. 75; Christopher v. Mungen, (1911) 61
Fla. 513, 55 So. 273. In State v.O'Neil, (1910) 147 Ia. 513, 126 N. W. 454,
33 L. R. A. 788, this state of facts was before the court. A statute was
declared unconstitutional. X committed an act under it which would have
violated it, had it been valid. Then the statute was held constitutional.
Held, X not subject to prosecution.
46 Pierce v.Pierce, (1874) 46 Ind. 86. This case perhaps loses some of
its force, however, because the statute which was involved in Langton v.
Applegate, (1854) 5 Ind. 327 was not the same statute involved in Greencastle So. Turnpike Co. v.State, (1867) 28 Ind. 382. The Greencastle case
reversed the Langton case, but the statutes before the court were not the
same, although the same provision of the constitution was involved in both
cases. The court in the Pierce case does not make any distinction on this
basis however, and the case is usually understood to announce the same
rule as those cases cited in note 45.
47 Gelpcke v.Dubuque, (1864) 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. Ed. 520; Los Angeles v.
Los Angeles Water Co., (1899) 177 U. S. 558, 20 S. Ct. 736, 44 L. Ed. 886.
These cases are severely criticized by several eminent writers on several
grounds. See 1 Willoughby, Constitutional Law, p. 10, and 2 Willoughby,
Ibid., p. 922-24. See on this topic generally, Dodd, Impairwent of the
Obligation of Contract by State Decisions, 4 IM. L. REV. 155, 327.
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statute was contrary to the constitution. 8 As indicated above, the
Indiana court itself has changed its mind as to the meaning of at
least one article of the constitution. To state the process in that way
is stating it too simply. As pointed out so ably by another, 49 the
process of construction and interpretation are much more complicated
than is indicated by the statement of the court alluded to above.
3. Suppose a state statute is declared to be contrary to the constitution of the United States. Then by subsequent action of congress
the states are allowed to enter the previously prohibited field. If the
statutes of the states on this point were to be considered in force it
would seem that they must have been re-enacted. But the courts hold
that they are revived without re-enactment by the state legislature. 0
The courts point out that they cannot repeal statutes and that the
statutes are not absolutely void, but remain on the statute books.
4. Suppose a statute which has been declared unconstitutional is
amended by legislative action so as to cure the defect which was found
in it. Will the statute then be in full force and effect? Or suppose
it is the provision of the constitution which has been changed so that
the statute would not contravene it in its new form. In the answers
given to these two questions by the courts there is a conflict of decisions. Those courts who treat the statute as void ab initio should
naturally hold that subsequent statutory or constitutional changes
cannot cure the defective statute. But they do not always seem to be
consistent in this, and the cases divide into several illogical groups on
these questions.'
48 Oolitic Stone Co. of Ind. v. Ridge, (1910) 169 Ind. 639, 91 N. E. 944.
See to the same effect Ex parte Bockhorn, (1911) 62 Tex. Cr. 651, 138 S.W.
706, where the court says that the decision of unconstitutionality "
was a mere judicial declaration of a pre-existing fact." This probaly indicates what is meant by mechanical jurisprudence as that term is used by
modern writers.
49 Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law, (2ed.) p. 171. That writer
says in this connection, "A judge puts before himself the printed page of
the statute book; it is mirrored on the retina of his eye and from this impression he has to reproduce the thought of the lawgiving body. The process is far from being merely mechanical; it is obvious how the character
of the judge, and the case of his mind must affect the operation, and what
a different shape the thought when reproduced in the mind of the judge
may have from that which it bore in the mind of the lawgiver. This is
true even if the function of the judge be deemed only that of attempting
to reproduce in his own mind the thought of the lawgiver . .
"
zo This seems to be the effect of In re Rahrer, (1891) 140 U. S.545, 11
S. Ct. 865, 35 L. Ed. 5727. See also Commonwealth v. Calhane, (1891)
154 Mass. 115, 27 N. E. 881; Sajar v. Dickinson, (1918) Ia. 169 N. W.
756; MeCollum v. AeConaughy, (1909) 141 Ia. 172, 119 N. W. 539.
51 See Ex parte Bockhorn, (1911) 62 Tex. Cr. 651, 138 S.W. 706; State
v. Tuffley, (1890) 20 Nev. 427, 19 A. S. R. 374. Contra, State v. City of
Cincinnati, (1895) 52 Oh. 419, 40 N. D. 508. See 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 77-79.
See Ross v. Bd., (1905) 128 Ia. 427, 104 N. W. 506, 1 L. R.A. (N. S.) 431.
See also note, 60 L. R. A. 564.
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5. Let us consider two cases in the law of crimes. First, let us
suppose that a person is convicted under an unconstitutional statute.
We have noted previously that the usual result in such a case is to
free the accused person. Now let us suppose that an indictment were
brought against this person under a statute which is constitutional.
He sets up in defence his prior indictment and trial under the unconstitutional statute. It has been held that if he acquiesced in the first
trial he may not be tried again, under the prohibition of double
jeopardy.5 2 In the second place let us suppose that an insane person is
committed under an unconstitutional statute. Is he set free when the
unconstitutionality of the statute *is determined? He is not.58 But
is there really much more reason why an insane person should be
restrained of his liberty under an unconstitutional statute than a
murderer who pleads guilty? The latter escapes, but the former does
not. Should not both of them be placed in such a position that they
are no longer able to threaten the community? But the prize winning
case in the realm of criminal law seems to the writer to be that of
In re Medley,-" wherein the prisoner was set free because a state
statute which was declared to be unconstitutional because ex post facto
was held to have repealed the previous state statute which had covered
the subject. Here certainly is a repudiation of the void ab initio
and in toto theory with a vengeance.
From the above review of the cases involving the effect of unconstitutionality it will be seen that the courts usually choose one of two
alternatives. They may follow strictly the view that an unconstitutional statute is void ab initio and refuse to recognize the validity of
any acts done in reliance on the statute. This sometimes leads to socalled strong decisions, decisions contrary to sense and justice. Or
they may choose to modify the general rule which they may have
previously enunciated, or refuase to apply it to a particular situation.
There are two views that are discernible in the foregoing cases. One
view is that just mentioned, that the statute is as though never passed.
The other is that the statute is as though passed, is to be relied upon,
and to be regarded as law until the statute is declared unconstitutional.
There are some situations where the courts are willing to follow the
void ab initio doctrine, but they are not so very numerous. There are
other situations in which the courts are in conflict whether the statute
is to be treated as void from the beginning or not. Then there is
52

McGinnis v. State -(1848) 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 43, 49 Am. Dec. 697.
re Boyett, (1904) 136 N. C. 415, 48 S. E. 789, 103 A. S. R. 944, 67
L. R. A. 972, 1 Ann. Cas. 729.
5' (1889) 134 U. S. 160, 10 S. Ct. 384, 33 L. Ed. 835. The court released
the prisoner because, ". . . it is apparent that while the statute under
which is now held in custody is an ez post facto law in regard to his offence,
531n

it repeals

ished

the former law, under which he might otherwise have been pun"
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another group of situations in which all courts refuse to adhere to
the doctrine that the statute is void from the beginning. From this
it can be seen that it is impossible to lay down as a general rule that
an unconstitutional statute is void, or is to be treated as no law. As
a matter of fact there are as many cases or more, and as many situations or more, where the courts hold the statute inoperative only from
the date of the decision as there are that hold it void from the beginning.
There is, however, another phase of the subject which is suggested
by the group of cases of which Shephard v. Wheeling55 is an example.
In that case the court said,
" .
it does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in
conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it, and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no
existence. The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the statute, but the decision affects the parties only, and there is
no judgment against the statute. The opinion or reasons of the court
may operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar
cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute book; it does
not repeal . . . the statute. The parties to that suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound. A new litigant
may bring a new suit, based upon the very same statute, and the
former decision cannot be pleaded as an estoppel, but can be relied
on only as a precedent. This constitutes the reason and basis of the
fundamental rule that a court will never pass upon the constitutionality of a statute unless it is absolutely necessary to do so in order to
decide the cause before it."
In the opinion of the Indiana court in the case of Pierce v. Pierce,56
previously referred to, the court assumes that in the two previous
cases which were discussed the same statute was involved. What
actually happened was that in the first case 57 where the statute was
declared unconstitutional there was a different statute involved than
in the second case58 where another statute was declared constitutional.
The court had before it in these two cases two different statutes, both
containing the same defect, and both cases turned upon the construction of the same constitutional provision. The court construed the
constitutional provision differently, not the statutes, in these two cases.
55

(1887) 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S. E. 635.

See this statement by the New

Jersey court in Allison v. Corker, (1902) 67 N. J. L. 596, 52 A. 362, "An

unconstitutional statute is nevertheless a statute; that is, a legislative act.
Such a statute is commonly spoken of as void. I should prefer to call it
unenforceable, because in conflict with a paramount law. If properly to be
called void, it is only so with reference to claims based upon it." See also
Rutten v. Mayor, etc., (1906) 73 N. J. L. 467, 64 A. 573; Bentley v. State
Bd. Medical Examiners, (1922) Ga. 111 S. E. 379. So a statute may be
unconstitutional as to past transactions, but valid as to future ones, Harlee
v. Ward, (1868) 15 Rich. Law (S. Car.) 231.
56 (1874) 46 Ind. 86.
U7Langton v. Applegate, (1854) 5 Ind. 327.
58 Greencastle So. Turnpike Co. v. State, (1867) 28 Ind. 382.
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Then in the Pierce case the court says that the rule is that where a
statute which has been held unconstitutional is subsequently held
constitutional, the statute is to be treated as a valid statute from the
date of its enactment. This question was not presented by the facts
of the case, however. It may be that the court was thinking in terms
of the constitutional provision instead of in terms of the statutes
involved.
This raises an interesting and somewhat important question. Suppose a statute is declared unconstitutional today. Is every statute on
the books which contains that same infirmity to be deemed unconstitutional also? Or does the declaration of unconstitutionality affect
only that particular statute which was before the court? There are
cases which seem to imply as the Indiana case does, that the broader
effect is to be given to the decision.5 9 When one stops to analyze the
decisions and the theories underlying them he is confronted with a
considerable task. The usual explanation of the process of declaring
statutes unconstitutional is that there is on the one side a body of
paramount rules and principles. These are collectively denominated
the constitution. Then there is another body of rules which are denominated statutes. It is not so important here whether we regard
the constitution and statutes as law or as sources of law.60 In the
decision of a given case the courts must apply a rule. Here are two
rules, or sources of rules. The rule found in the constitution must
prevail. But the question still remains, what becomes of the other
rule? Is it still a rule, only held in abeyance? Or is it entirely abrogated forever, unless the legislature which gave expression to it in the
statute shall again express its will in another statute? It is quite
clear why statutes are declared unconstitutional in many instances.
But it is not so clear why it shall be said that the statute is entirely
abrogated by a decision of a court that it is unconstitutional. Perhaps
we will need to peer deeper to find the reason which caused the courts
in the early cases to hold that the statute was void ab initio. Law
does not consist only of rules of conduct.6' But it so happens that it
is this phase of the content of the term that we have in the recent past
- See Commnwnwealtl v. Calhane, (1891) 154 Mass. 115, 27 N. E. 881;
Stajar v. Dickinson, (1918) Ia. 169 N. W. 756; McCollum v. McConaughy,
(1909) 141 Ia. 172, 119 N. W. 539.
60 Gray, Nature and Sources of Law, (2ed.) p. 170, insists that consti-

tutions and statutes are only sources of law. I4 Pound, Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence, (3ed.) p. 93, legislation is given as one of the
forms of law.
61 For a convincing demonstration that this is so see Pound, The Theory
of Judicial Decisions, 36 H. L. R. 641, 802, 940. "These three elements
that make up the whole of what we call law are: (1) a number of legal
precepts more or less defined, the element to which Bentham referred when
he said that law was an aggregate of laws; (2) a body of traditional ideas
as legal precepts should be interpreted and applied and causes decided, and
a traditional technique of developing and applying legal precets whereby
these precepts are eked out, extended, restricted, and adapted to the exigen-
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stressed the most. In the minds of many judges is often to be found
the outline of an ideal pattern towards which they seek to make the
law move. This is as it should be. Constitutional law and constitutional interpretation are often as much affected by the views we
entertain on the subject of government as by our ideas of strict law.
Is it not only reasonable to expect, therefore, that the judges will be
influenced by their ideas of government in the making of decisions in
this field'? Could the human mind so operate as to exclude it? If
there be any truth in this view it may be that here is some light on
what caused the early courts to hold that the statute was not only
inoperative from the decision, but from the time of purported enactment. The American ideal of government during the past century
was and still is that there are three departments of government, each
with its own functions and powers. The constitution prescribes
the limits of each. Neither of them should overstep these limits. In
these cases under review the courts find that the legislature or executive department has overstepped its bounds. In an ideal system they
would not do this, and so the judges in the early cases decided to
treat these excesses as though they had never happened, because they
should not have happened. The problem was viewed and treated as
one of legislative power or capacity. This may offer a partial explanation for a rule which seems to be rather ill-suited to modern conditions.
It is submitted that the view set forth in the Shephard case, 62 more
nearly describes what actually takes place in the majority of situations which the courts meet in this branch of the law than do any of
the other explanations offered.
In view of the cases reviewed above one is a little surprised to find
the doctrine of void ab initio stated as the universal and unqualified
rule by so eminent an authority as Cooley, in his work on CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS,
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"When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it
had never been. Rights cannot be built up under it; contracts which
depend upon it for their consideration are void; it constitutes a protection to no one who has acted under it, and no one can be punished
for having refused obedience to it before the decision was made."
That this statement is not in accord with the cases would seem clearly
right from the above review of both federal and state cases. It illustrates, however, the persistence with which even eminent text writers
will cling to the view that unconstitutional statutes are void ab initio.
cies of administration of justice; (3) a body of philosophical, political and
ethical ideas as to the end of law, and as to what legal precepts should be
in view thereof, held consciously or subconsciously, with reference to which
legal precepts and the traditional ideas of application and decision and the
traditional technique are continually reshaped adn given new content or
new application." p. 645. Each of the three articles deals with one of these
elements.
02 See note 55 and cases.
03 (7ed.) p. 259 and note 2.
Several of the cases cited in this note do not
bear out the broad statement quoted above.
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SUMMARY

In summary the rules of law which have been followed by the
courts in the cases reviewed in this article might be classified as follows:
I. Situations in which the court adheres to the view that the statute
is void ab initio.
1. The case of a repealing statute, except in the case of In re Medley.
2. An unconstitutional amendment to a statute.
3. Where criminal conviction under an unconstitutional statute is
reversed.
4. Judgment in civil suit rendered under an unconstitutional statute
or by a court which is established or granted jurisdiction by an
unconstitutional statute, except as limited by the de facto officer
doctrine.
5. Incorporation or disincorporation of a city, except as affected
by the de facto doctrine.
6. Taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute may be recovered.
This doctrine is curtailed in practical operation by the limitations enforced by the courts regarding voluntary payment.
7. The so-called stripping doctrine under the eleventh amendment
to the United States Constitution.
8. Individual liability in criminal action for acts committed under
unconstitutional statute.
II. Situations in which the courts are in conflict whether the rule
should be that of void ab initio or that of void from the date of the
declaration of unconstitutionality by the court.
1. Unconstitutional statutes as creating a moral obligation on the
government or on individuals.
2. Creation of a public office.
3. Liability of officers in civil suit for acts done in reliance on an
unconstitutional statute.
4. Liability of individuals in civil action for acts done in reliance
on an unconstitutional statute.
5. Defence of an officer to an action of mandamus to compel him
to act under an unconstitutional statute.
6. Curing of the defect of unconstitutionality by a statutory
amendment.
7. Curing defect of unconstitutionality by a change in the constitution.
III. Situations in which the courts refuse to apply the void ab initio
doctrine and apply the doctrine of void from the time of the declaration of unconstitutionality.
1. Criminal Liability of an officer who has acted under an unconstitutional statute.
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2. Reversal of a decision of unconstitutionality.
3. Reversal of a decision of constitutionality with rights acquired in
reliance on first decision.
4. Criminal conviction under unconstitutional statute and double
jeopardy and the commitment of an insane person under an
unconstitutional statute.
IV. There is a fourth group of cases which hold that an unconstitutional statute is not void at all, but that the statute is only inapplicable to the particular situation presented to the court in a given
case. The statute may be applicable to other situations and is therefore said to be constitutional as to them.

